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Abstract 
 
Much as has been written and done to prevent Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR) practices 
but FFR is still exists in the corporate world. It is common to think about FFR practices in large 
companies for its greater amount of consequences, though such practises have negative conse-
quences in small companies as well. FFR practices raise questions about the legitimacy of con-
temporary financial reporting process, roles of auditors, regulators, and analysts in financial 
reporting. This empirical study attempts to investigate the motivational factors of the preven-
tion and detection of FFR through the auditing process. The interviewees were carried out 
within the entity and proprietary theoretical framework with some accounting related manage-
ment in two medium-sized organizations in Atlantic Canada in winter 2008. The findings of 
this research demonstrate that an audit is not enough to prevent and detect FFR.  The audit 
structure needs to be revised and employees need to be educated in order for them to better 
understand their internal control process, and their own role. Companies need to evaluate their 
controls and internal audit process instead of relying on the yearly audit. This study found that 
the most common methods used for FFR are improper revenue recognition, understatement of 
expenses/liabilities, and overstated and misappropriation of assets. 
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1.  Background 
 
Auditors Role 
 
It is generally held belief that auditors’ 
job to find fraud and error as part of the 
scope of the engagement for auditing 
financial statements.  Fraud can be de-
fined as intentional misstatements that 
can be classified into two types.  The 
first is misstatements arising from 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR) 
and second misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets.  Therefore 
errors are the unintentional acts that 
cause financial statements to be mis-
Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting 
Vol. 4, No. 1 June 2010 
Pp 65-73 
 
Can Audit Prevent Fraudulent Financial Re-
porting Practices? Study of Some Motivational 
Factors in Two Atlantic Canadian Entities 
 
Mostaq M. Hussain 
 Patricia Kennedy  
Victoria Kierstead 
Faculty of Business 
University of New Brunswick-Saint John 
Canada 
66         M. M Hussain, P. Kennedy, V. Kierstead / Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting 1 (2010) 65-73    
 
stated.  As Messier and Emby (2004) 
elicited a number of reasons of FFR. 
They are: (1). Manipulation, falsifica-
tion, or alteration of accounting records 
or supporting documents from which 
financial statements are prepared. (2). 
Misrepresentation in, or intentional 
omission from, the financial statement of 
events, transaction, or other significant 
information. (3). Intentional misapplica-
tion of accounting principles relating to 
amounts, classification, manner of pres-
entation, or disclosure. (4). Management 
override of internal controls that other-
wise may appear to be operating effec-
tively. However, misappropriation is the 
result of theft of the company’s assets 
and can include: embezzling cash re-
ceipts, stealing assets, causing the com-
pany to pay for goods or services not 
received. 
 
Fraud can be committed in a number of 
ways. There are several ‘red flags’ men-
tioned in Warrick and Riner’s (2004) 
study. According to Warrick and Riner 
(2004), an auditor should look for a 
number of issues when performing an 
audit, like: (I) Unusual or complex trans-
actions, (II) Emphasis of management 
on short term earnings, (III) Pressure to 
meet stock analyst expectations, (IV). 
Accounting estimates for valuing things 
such as warranty expenses, (V). Weak 
internal controls, (VI). A weak or non-
active board of directors, and (VII). In-
centive compensation plans structured 
on high financial performance. 
 
According to the Committee of Sponsor-
ing Organizations (COSO, 1999), large 
adjusting entries at the end of the quarter 
or year that involve revenue or asset ac-
counts should be considered carefully. 
 
The National Commission on FFR (also 
known as the US Treadway Commis-
sion) did an in depth study on FFR in 
1987.  The report outlined ways to pre-
vent and detect FFR.  “The prevention 
and detection of fraudulent reporting is 
important because the financial reporting 
process relies on the integrity of the re-
ported information.”(Warrick and Riner, 
2004). The Treadway Commission iden-
tifies the control environment, ‘tone at 
the top,’ as the most important factor in 
preventing FFR, it will be senior man-
agement that is the first defense against 
FFR.  Even though senior management 
is the first defense in many cases it is 
senior management who is involved in 
FFR.  With increasing pressures from 
shareholders to maximize earnings it is 
often senior managers who feel the most 
pressure to make the organization more 
profitable.  Ernst & Young (2000) issued 
the findings of its general international 
fraud study (not limited to FFR), which 
states that employees committed 82 per-
cent of frauds with management being 
involved in one third of those. 
 
In the business environment importance 
should be placed on internal controls as 
this is the first defense in preventing 
fraud on an individual level.  Internal 
controls can be difficult to implement 
depending on the size of the organiza-
tion. Large corporations with hundreds 
of administrative staff are more likely to 
have efficient segregation of duties than 
an organization that only has a few ad-
ministrative staff.  According to COSO, 
fraudulent reporting occurs most often in 
smaller corporations.  There are five 
components of internal control: control 
environment, risk assessment, control 
activities, information and communica-
tion, and monitoring.  The control envi-
ronment sets the tone of the organization 
as it is the foundation of all other con-
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trols.  Several circumstances can affect 
the risk assessment of a corporation. 
They include (but are not limited) to: 
new personnel, rapid growth, new tech-
nology, and foreign operations.  Control 
activities are the policies and procedures 
that help to ensure that the appropriate 
measures are taken to address the risks.  
The controls can include but are not lim-
ited to: segregation of duties, under-
standing of control activities and per-
formance reviews.  Information and 
communication refers to the information 
system relevant to the financial reporting 
objectives and communication is provid-
ing an understanding of individual roles 
and responsibilities.  Pre-assumably, a 
well operating information system can 
reduce the risk of material misstatement 
when monitoring assesses the quality of 
internal control over time.  During the 
course of an audit these and other inter-
nal controls will be evaluated by the 
auditor to ensure they are sufficient. The 
auditor will also establish materiality, 
the level of misstatement that will not 
affect the decision of a reasonable user 
of the financial statements. 
 
Prevention of Fraud 
 
The Treadway Commission cited that 
education as one way of preventing 
fraud by making those who are responsi-
ble for the everyday accounting duties 
and making aware of how fraud is com-
mitted and then educating them about 
detecting procedure. In addition to edu-
cating employees about how to prevent 
and detect fraud the board of directors 
can play a key role in preventing fraud.  
The board should support the ‘tone at 
the top’ or even set the tone of the or-
ganization.  It is the board who can di-
rect management to have certain preven-
tion and detection controls in place. 
These could include, according to Car-
penter (2001): (I). Internal controls as 
the first line of defense. (II). Using inter-
nal auditors that report to an audit com-
mittee of the board of directors rather 
than senior management. (IV). Hold 
management accountable to the same 
standards of misconduct as non-
management. (V). Use fraud detection 
software. (VI). Effectively communicate 
ethics and fraud programs to the em-
ployees to ensure that employees per-
ceive the programs to be working.  
Moreover, Warrick and Riner (2004) 
suggested the appropriate segregation of 
duties, and the need of performing ratio 
analyses on firm account balances. 
Beasley (2000) argues that audit com-
mittees should meet at least quarterly, 
and according to NCFFR (1987), Audit 
committee members should be of the 
firm. 
 
Understanding why employees commit 
fraud is a key factor in being able to de-
tect fraud.  A study by Hollinger and 
Clark with 12, 000 employees in the 
workforce found that nearly 90% en-
gaged in ‘workplace deviance’, which 
included behavior such as goldbricking, 
workplace slowdowns, sick time abuses 
and pilferage.  On top of that, an aston-
ishing one-third of employees actually 
had stolen money or merchandise on the 
job. (Wells, 2001)  There are three fac-
tors that contribute to employees com-
mitting fraud they are: pressure, oppor-
tunity, and rationalization.  If employees 
feel they are not being treated fairly and 
adequately they are more likely to com-
pensate themselves in the form of 
“wages in kind”.  Fraud is also commit-
ted because of financial pressures.  Cres-
sey (in Wells, 2001) found that the em-
ployees “must perceive an opportunity 
to commit and conceal their crimes, and 
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be able to rationalize their offenses as 
something other than criminal activ-
ity” (Wells, 2001). Wells also lists a 
number of questions. Whenever they are 
answered positively, there should be a 
red flag for fraud motivation. The ques-
tions are follows: 
 Is management compensation tied 
closely to company value? 
 Is management dominated by a sin-
gle person or a small group? 
 Does management display a signifi-
cant disregard for regulations or 
controls? 
 Has management restricted the audi-
tor’s access to documents or person-
nel? 
 Has management set unrealistic fi-
nancial goals? 
 Does management have any [past 
history of illegal conduct? 
 Is an employee obviously dissatis-
fied? 
 Does that employee have a past his-
tory of dishonesty or illegal con-
duct? 
 Does that employee have known 
financial pressures, such as exces-
sive debt, bad credit or tax liens? 
 Has that employee’s lifestyle or be-
havior changed significantly? 
 
The growth of the modern corporation 
has given the rise to absentee owners 
(shareholders) and the use of managers 
(agents) to operate the corporation on a 
day-to-day basis.  “The agency relation-
ship between an owner and manager 
produces a natural conflict of interest 
because of the information asymmetry 
this means that, the manager generally 
has more information about the ‘true’ 
financial position and results of opera-
tions of the entity than the absentee 
owner does.  If both parties seek to 
maximize their own self-interest, it is 
likely that the manager will not act in the 
best interest of the owner.” (Messier and 
Emby, 2004)  By having the corporation 
audited the auditor adds value to infor-
mation by increasing its reliability and 
credibility. 
 
It is management’s duty to be aware of 
the consequences of fraudulent reporting 
whether it is legal, social or ethical.  The 
news has been dominated in recent years 
by many scandalous tales of large corpo-
rations committing fraud.  For example 
Enron has had to restate their financial 
statements for a total of eight billion dol-
lars and some of the executives have 
been charged with committing fraud.  
Fraud is not limited to corporations. One 
of the Big Four firms Arthur Anderson, 
“was the auditor for a number if entities 
involved in FFR.  The effect of Arthur 
Anderson was devastating.  Their com-
plicity with the scandals ultimately de-
stroyed them.”(Warrick and Riner, 
2004) 
 
 
2.  Methodology 
Research Method 
 
To develop a better understanding of the 
motivational factor on fraudulent report-
ing and how an audit can detect and pre-
vent it from control fraud we turned to a 
prominent Saint John company (X), and 
an accounting firm (Z), in order to have 
a diversified view.  Semi structured in-
terviews were conducted with each in-
terviewee on March 20, 2008 and April 
4, 2008 respectively.  The first inter-
viewee is from Company X and the sec-
ond interviewee is from Company Z. 
These two were selected to evaluate the 
opinion on auditing from the perspective 
of a large corporation and that of firm.  
The interviews were conducted on site 
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during an hour long pre-booked appoint-
ment.  Notes were taken during the inter-
views and organizing the interview re-
sults immediate after the interviews.  
The first interviewee holds a CA and 
was chosen because of his extensive 
knowledge of business practices in large 
companies.  The second interviewee has 
her BBA and was selected for her 
knowledge in accounting practices from 
the perspective of a large firm as well as 
her previous experiences in the industry.  
Following the interviews, secondary 
sources of information was scrutinized 
in order to find the consistency/
inconsistency of provided information. 
However, the exact references of secon-
dary source are not elicited here in order 
to not disclose information about the 
names of the organizations interviewed. 
 
Theoretical Framework: Entity Theory 
 
The entity theory is based on the simple 
equation that assets are equal to equities 
(liabilities plus shareholder’s eq-
uity).  Assets and liabilities are consid-
ered to be resources and obligations of 
the entity itself, but not the shareholders 
or proprietors. If management is com-
mitting fraudulent reporting, the number 
within this equation will not be cor-
rect.  Management over valuating one or 
several assets can greatly change the 
company’s financial statements.  The 
difference between liabilities and share-
holder’s equity is that rights of the credi-
tors can be determined independently of 
other valuations- if the firm is sol-
vent.  The stockholder’s rights are meas-
ured by the valuation of the assets origi-
nally invested plus any reinvested earn-
ings and revaluations. The equity hold-
ers of the firm have the right to receive 
dividends and share in net assets in the 
event that the firm should cease opera-
tions upon liquidation. 
 
The entity theory is quoted as being 
“income centered”.   Any net income or 
loss of the firm within a given year be-
longs to the firm.  In the event that the 
firm has a positive net income on the 
income statement for the year, will only 
be considered income to the sharehold-
ers if dividends are declared.  In this ex-
ample the amount of income to the 
shareholders will be the amount of the 
dividend that they receive from the 
firm.  The remaining profit belongs to 
the firm. 
 
It is the entity theory that contributes to 
fraud because when the company is suc-
cessful, in terms of a positive net in-
come, money can be distributed to 
shareholders. In this case, if fraudulent 
reporting occurs then this net income or 
loss has the potential to state in a way 
that goes far away from the truth and 
fairness.  More successful a company is 
the one that distributed more money to 
the shareholders.  If a company is suc-
cessful they can raise additional capital 
based on the past distributions and the 
predicted future distributions.  The pro-
prietary theory can contribute to fraud 
on the basis that executives are tempted 
to record assets and liabilities inappro-
priately to increase their wealth.  Share-
holders are also seeking to invest in a 
company with an increasing net income 
so that they may receive higher divi-
dends.  Management may be pressured 
by shareholder to show a positive net 
income for this reason. 
 
 
3.  Empirical Findings and Analysis 
 
We recently interviewed Kevin Houri-
han who is a chartered accountant with 
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Company X and asked him his opinion 
on the prevention of FFR through audit-
ing.  Kevin’s opinion is that “an audit is 
not an effective means of detecting or 
preventing fraudulent financial reporting 
within a large company” like the one he 
works for.  “Audits usually run with the 
assumption that management has integ-
rity.  An auditor would not normally 
take a job if they suspected that manage-
ment was corrupt.”  Auditors are more 
looking for errors and omissions that are 
honest mistakes.  Kevin’s take on the 
matter is that of course they do look 
through internal controls to see if the 
company has the proper controls and 
policies, however if fraud were happen-
ing it would be very hard for an auditor 
to detect through sampling and testing.   
 
If the company is large with several em-
ployees it should be harder for fraudu-
lent reporting to occur within the organi-
zation.  Large scale companies often 
have well designed controls which make 
it harder for fraud to occur.  Depending 
on how well planned and executed the 
fraud was (even if the auditor were to 
look at that) the particular entries in-
volved may not catch fraud.  Kevin be-
lieves that usually when management 
decides to peruse at fraudulent reporting 
action, it is generally well planned and 
executed which makes it harder for audi-
tors to detect. 
 
Kevin also points out that it would be 
very hard for one person to commit 
fraud within an organization.  An exam-
ple that he provided us with would be 
booking a sale.  “If an employee booked 
a nonexistent sale it would most likely 
get noticed by someone in another group 
such as collections or banking.”  This 
would be much easier in a smaller com-
pany where one person does many ac-
counting functions. Kevin’s opinion in 
short is that a company needs to have the 
proper controls in place to prevent fraud 
and not rely on their audit.  Detecting 
fraud is not the main goal of the audit.  
The audit is done primarily to test the 
financial statements of the company for 
accuracy but not for investigating fraud.  
If the audit were to test fraud it would be 
cost prohibitive due to the great deal of 
time would possibly be involved in it. 
 
A second interview was conducted with 
Shelly Roy a supervisor with Company 
Z.  We asked for her opinion on whether 
FFR could be prevented through audit.  
She felt that audit was not an effective 
means to prevent FFR.  Shelley elabo-
rates by explaining “the main focus on 
an audit is not to detect or prevent fraud 
but is to provide reasonable assurance 
that financial statements are free from 
material misstatements”. Shelley feels it 
is the controls that the company has and 
enforces that prevent fraud.  She noted 
that “an audit examines evidence that 
supports the amounts and disclosures in 
the financial statements. As part of audit 
procedures, controls are reviewed to de-
velop an understanding of risk that may 
be associated with amounts in the finan-
cial statements”.  An example of a con-
trol procedure is the Company having 
segregation of duties for banking. This 
means that there are two signing authori-
ties and those who can prepare cheques 
are not signing authorities. This prevents 
the individual from issuing an unauthor-
ized payment to themselves.  During an 
audit, if there was not proper segregation 
of duties, control risk would be assessed 
at an elevated level and more sampling 
and testing on cash would be required. 
 
Well (2002) says, “I don’t think an audi-
tor could uncover fraud if he stepped on 
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it”.  Such opinion may be a negative 
opinion on our audit system, but accord-
ing to Craig A. Latshaw, in his article on 
FFR, he mentions that the Government 
and Accounting Profession React, there 
may be some truth to it.  The report 
highlights that although the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and initiatives that have been 
started by the AICPA attempt to reduce 
fraud but they are not enough. There are 
still some large issues unresolved as far 
as FFR is concerned.  Management can 
still override internal controls in order to 
produce FFR.  As started in Latshaw’s 
article “unfortunately, the majority of 
work carried on by auditors using the 
current system concentrates on the dis-
covery of unintentional errors which, 
with an adequate system of internal con-
trol, will be detected by the company’s 
accounting system” (Latshaw, 2002).  
After conducting the interviews and 
based on the empirical findings both 
Kevin and Shelly are correct in stating 
that internal controls play a large role in 
the prevention of FFR but not the audit.  
It is however evident that when the in-
ternal controls fail and managements 
greed blinds them to their ethical duties, 
auditors should be looking for ‘red flags’ 
even in the most prominent companies.  
The audits preformed by Arthur Ander-
son did not detect or prevent fraud in 
many companies but may in fact have 
contributed to it.   
 
The Enron financial scandal perhaps the 
most discussed case of fraudulent report-
ing revealed in late 2001 which led to its 
bankruptcy.  This scandal also caused 
the dissolution of Arthur Anderson, i.e. 
Enron’s accounting firm (which at the 
time was one of the world’s top five ac-
counting firms), when it was discovered 
that they had destroyed important audit 
documents.  Enron used offshore entities 
to create the illusion that they were more 
profitable than they actually were which 
drove up the stock price even though 
they were actually losing money.  Only 
the executives knew of the existence of 
these offshore accounts that were actu-
ally hiding the losses, the investors knew 
nothing about it.  At the same time those 
executives were working on insider in-
formation and trading millions of dollars 
worth of Enron stock.  This took several 
years to unravel and went undetected by 
auditors.  The Enron scandal brought to 
light potential conflicts of interest be-
tween consultancy and auditing work 
and the need for tighter regulation on 
financial derivatives trading.  Enron is 
proof that an audit cannot prevent fraud 
when the accounting firm is in collusion 
with the company committing fraud. 
 
After the fall of Enron some of the other 
companies that Arthur Anderson repre-
sented were investigated.  Qwest Com-
munications was subsequently reviewed 
and it was found that they had inappro-
priately recognized revenue and four 
executives including the CFO were 
charged with conspiracy to commit an 
offense against the U.S., securities fraud, 
making false statements, and wire fraud 
affecting a financial institution.   An-
other communication giant (WorldCom) 
also fall victim to fraudulent reporting in 
June of 2002. WorldCom announces that 
they have been over stating profits by 
classifying routine expenses as capital 
expenditures a month later WorldCom 
has filed for bankruptcy.  CEO, Bernie 
Webbers is tried and convicted of falsi-
fying regulatory filings with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission in 
2001 and 2002.    
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4.  Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that 
audit cannot solely detect and prevent 
FFR, or say, an audit is not enough to 
prevent and detect fraudulent reporting. 
It appears that although fraud has higher 
audit risk and can cause an audit to fail 
but it still receives the least amount of 
attention. Empirical evidence supports 
that the audit structure needs to be re-
vised in light of the numerous fraud 
cases that are being exposed.  Employ-
ees need to be educated so that they can 
better understand internal controls and 
their role in the organizations.  Compa-
nies need to evaluate their controls and 
scrutinize their internal audit, or audit 
committees, to ensure that gaps that 
cause ‘red flags’ are filled. It is found in 
the empirical evidence that companies 
should not just simply rely on the yearly 
audit to detect fraud but should take pre-
ventive control measures.  
 
The research results, i.e. empirical evi-
dence, do not seem to be consistent with 
the entity theory but more in line of the 
arguments of proprietary theory. Man-
agement continuously experiences out-
side pressures to increase profits.  Such 
pressures mostly come from the share-
holders in order to receive the benefits 
of their proprietorship/shareholdings, 
though a business organization is an in-
dependent entity. Moreover, competitive 
tendency of companies - not just simply 
want to maintain their current size but 
they want to grow, also creating the 
pressure on management to increase and 
maintain higher stock value.   
 
The objective of the proprietary theory is 
the determination and analysis of the 
proprietor’s net worth.  In the case of 
fraudulent reporting -if in fact fraud has 
occurred, the company's net worth on 
the financial statements will likely not 
be correct.  Represented by the equation, 
i.e. Assets – Liabilities = Proprietor’s 
Equity.  The proprietor owns the assets 
and liabilities, and therefore, the liabili-
ties are negative assets of the proprietor 
making such equation balance sheet cen-
tered.  Bookkeeping can be viewed as 
the proprietor accounting for his own 
property, and such a view can be 
adapted to corporations as well because 
they are accountable to shareholders for 
the profitability of their investment.  
When the corporation is profitable and 
retained earnings are high then share-
holders are having access to higher 
amount of wealth (as form of dividends). 
 
The origins of the proprietary theory 
have been traced, in Britain, to Malcomb 
(1718) who distinguished transactions 
that produced profit and subsequently 
increased proprietors’ capital, from 
those which did not.  The theory was 
further developed by Stephens (1735) 
and Fulton (1800), and was fully fledged 
by Conhelm (1818).  He added the alge-
braic approach to transaction analysis 
with transactions affecting the account-
ing equation (by increasing or decreas-
ing capital, assets and liabilities) and this 
study finds the evidence to support that 
notion rather than the consideration of 
business entity that prevent FFR. 
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